I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i's own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. In this setting we demonstrate that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space of games. This result generalizes a well-known structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens [6] .
Introduction
The study of topological properties of the graphs of various equilibrium correspondences is an important ingredient of present-day equilibrium analysis. It provides a unified treatment of such topics as existence, optimality, (in)determinateness of equilibrium and dynamics of adjustment processes. The classical work of Balasko [1] serves an excellent illustration of how the properties of the equilibrium manifold can be used to approach some traditional problems in general equilibrium theory. Furthermore, the study of equilibrium manifolds is of a considerable independent interest.
In Kohlberg and Mertens [6, Theorem 1] it is shown that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in normal form games is homeomorphic to Euclidean space. In the context of a pure exchange economy, Balasko [1] shows that the graph of the Walrasian equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to Euclidean space. A topological characterization of the pseudo-equilibrium manifold in economies with incomplete markets is given in Zhou [8] . Related references are Blume and Zame [2] and Govindan and Wilson [5] where the semi-algebraic nature of various game-theoretic solution concepts is established, and Demichelis and Germano [3, 4] who focus at the unknottedness property of equilibrium manifolds.
This paper contributes to the literature above by establishing the analogue of the Kohlberg and Mertens' [6] structure theorem in a very general setup. I consider the space of normal form games as parameterized by payoff functions. It is assumed that the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex set of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i's own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. In this setting it is demonstrated that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space of games. In addition, I show that there exists a homeomorphism that preserves the multilinearity in the payoff functions. The result of Kohlberg and Mertens [6] then follows as a corollary to this structure theorem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review some mathematical concepts needed for the proof of the structure theorem. As a motivation for the proof, we first establish our result for one-player games. The analysis of this special case is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we review the structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens [6] . The general structure theorem is established in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the notation and review some mathematical concepts used in the proof of the structure theorem.
The subdifferential and the normal vectors. Given two vectors x and y of R n we let x, y denote the scalar product of x and y. Let f : R n −→ R be a concave function, and
The set of all subgradients of u at x is called a subdifferential of u at x and is denoted by ∂u(x). By Theorem 23.8 from Rockafellar [7, p. 223] , for any two concave functions f,f : R n −→ R, the subdifferential of the sum is equal to the sum of the subdifferentials:
Let C be a compact convex set of R n and x be a point of C. The vector x * in R n is a normal vector to the set C at the point x if
The set of all normal vectors to the set C at the point x is denoted by N x [C] . The normal bundle of the set C is a subspace of C × R n defined as
By Theorem 27.4 from Rockafellar [7, p. 270] , the point x is the maximum of the concave function f on the set C if and only if ∂u(
The compact open topology. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and let F (X, Y ) be the set of all continuous functions from X to Y . The compact open topology on F (X, Y ) is defined by the subbase consisting of all sets of the form {f ∈ F (X, Y ) :
where E is a compact set of X and U is an open set of Y . Below we list some properties of the compact open topology.
Suppose that X is a locally compact Hausdorff space. Then the evaluation map e :
, is continuous with respect to the compact open topology.
Suppose that X is a locally compact Hausdorff space. Consider a mapping f : The mapping In this section we consider one-player games where the player's strategy set is X and his payoff function is an element f of the space F . A Nash equilibrium of the game f is a strategy that maximizes the payoff function f on the set X. The Nash equilibrium correspondence assigns to each f ∈ F the set of Nash equilibria of the game f . Thus the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the subspace
As we show in Theorem 1 below, the space N is homeomorphic to the space F . The main difficulty that the proof has to deal with is the possibility of multiple maxima. To illustrate, letF be a subspace of F consisting of all strictly concave functions, and letN be the subspace N ∩ (F × X) of N . Since each function inF has a unique maximum, the natural projectionπ :N −→F that sends the pair (f, x) to the function f is a one-to-one map. In fact, one can show it is a homeomorphism. It cannot be extended to a homeomorphism between N and F , however. To see this, observe thatN is a dense set of N . It follows that the only continuous extension ofπ to the space N is the natural projection π : N −→ F that sends (f, x) to f . However, π is not an injective mapping.
Given Proof. To see that φ is a continuous mapping, observe that it extends to a mapping 
+
of F × X, where i denotes the identity map of F , l is a map that assigns to each point x of X the linear transformation l x , and + denotes the addition map. Since both l and + are continuous with respect to the compact open topology, it follows that φ is a continuous mapping. Now we construct the inverse of φ. Letf be a real-valued function on R
. Let the mapping ψ be defined as follows:
where x is the unique maximizer of the strictly concave function f +f on the set X. To see that the mapping ψ is continuous, let S ⊂ F be the subspace of all strictly concave functions, let +f : F −→ S be the mapping that sends the function f into the function f +f , let s : S −→ X be the mapping that assigns to each strictly concave function f the unique maximizer of f on the set X, and l − : X −→ F be the map that sends each point x of X into the linear transformation −l x . The mappings +f , s and l − are continuous with respect to the compact open topology. Now the component of ψ that maps to X can be written as a composition It follows that ψ is a continuous mapping. Now we show that ψ maps into the set N . Since the function (f +f ) attains its maximum on the set X at the point x, its subdifferential at x has a non-empty intersection with the normal cone N x [X] to the set X at the point x. By direct computation, the subdifferential of the function (f +f ) at point x coincides with that of the function (f −l x ):
This implies that the function (f − l x ) attains its maximum on the set X at the point x, as desired.
Clearly, φ • ψ is the identity map on the set F . To see that ψ • φ is the identity on N , let (f, x) be a point in N . Then (ψ • φ)(f, x) = (f + l x − lx,x), withx being a point of X where the function (f + l x +f ) attains its maximum. Since the function f attains its maximum on X at the point x, the subdifferential ∂f (x) of f at x has a point in common with the set N x [X] . A direct computation shows that
implying that the function (f + l x +f ) attains its maximum on X at the point x. Therefore x =x, and (ψ • φ)(f, x) = (f, x), as desired. Thus we have proved that φ is a homeomorphism, with ψ being its inverse.
Finally, observe that the mapping φ preserves linearity, strict concavity, and C r -differentiability of the functions, and so does ψ. The second part of the theorem follows. 
x is a Nash equilibrium of the game u .
Theorem 2 (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986)
The space G is homeomorphic to R np .
The homeomorphism used by Kohlberg and Mertens is defined as a mapping
is an element of R p given by the equation
It is helpful to have an expression for the value ofū 
The product after the square brackets is equal to one whenever z is an element of ∆.
The general structure theorem
In this section we study a richer class of games than the class of normal form games introduced in the previous section. Now the payoff function of player i need not be a multilinear function, but is only required to be continuous and concave in player i's own strategies. Moreover, we allow the strategy set of each player to be a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space. In this setting we prove that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space of games. We refine this result by demonstrating that, if the player's strategy sets do not contain the zero vector, then there exists a homeomorphism between the graph of the Nash correspondence and the space of games that preserves the multilinearity in the payoff functions. This allows us to derive Theorem 2 as a corollary to our general structure theorem. Let the strategy set X i of player i ∈ N be a non-empty compact convex set of
with the compact open topology and we let F denote the product space
The graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the subspace of F × X given by
be a continuous mapping such that for each point 
where id is the identity map on R k i . Given the mappings t i and r i , define the mapping φ as follows:
Observe that, when n = 1 (the one-player case), the mapping φ as defined above coincides with the mapping introduced in Section 3. The freedom that one has in the choice of the mappings t i and r i will be exploited later to construct the mapping φ that preserves the multilinearity in the payoff functions. Now we state our basic result.
Theorem 3 The mapping φ is a homeomorphism.
Proof. Define the mapping ψ as follows: We show that ψ maps to the set N . Let u be a point in F , and suppose that ψ(u) = (ū, x). We must show that 
is a non-empty set. As the homeomorphism p i x carries the point (z
), we have the following sequence of equations:
where the function 
] is a non-empty set. Thusx
for each player i, andū = u, as desired. We have thus proved that φ is a homeomorphism, with ψ being its inverse. Now that we have a family of homeomorphisms between the spaces N and F , we can identify those homeomorphisms that preserve some natural properties of the payoff functions such as multilinearity, differentiability, and linearity (strict concavity) of the payoff function u . In Theorem 5 we establish the existence of a homeomorphism between N and F that preserves multilinearity in the payoff functions, and derive Theorem 2 as a corollary.
Consider the mapping
Theorem 4
The mapping η is a homeomorphism. Furthermore, letF , respectively. Thus η is a homeomorphism and its inverse is the mapping
It is easy to see that both η and its inverse carry 
] is non-singular. By the separating hyperplane theorem, there is a vector s in
be a basis of the linear subspace of R k i orthogonal to the vector s. Given an 
Conclusions
This paper provides a topological characterization of the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a very general setup. We consider normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex set of the Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i's own strategies.
Our basic result states that the graph N of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to the space F of games, as parameterized by the payoff functions. This basic result is supplemented by two important refinements, demonstrating the existence of homeomorphisms between N and F that are, in a certain sense, well-behaved.
The first of the refinements shows that there exists a homeomorphism between N and F that preserves differentiability of the payoff function of each player i in all variables and linearity and strict concavity in player i's own strategies.
The second refinement applies whenever the strategy sets do not contain the zero vectors. In this case, there exists a homeomorphism between N and F that preserves multilinearity in the payoff functions. As a corollary, we show that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence restricted to the subspace of normal form games with multilinear payoffs is homeomorphic to a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. This is a known result due to Kohlberg and Mertens [6] .
